Narrative and International Relations, Part 3: Actors and Systems

Identity as a Form of International Governance

In Part 2, we started our close reading of Miskimmon et al¹ with a deep dive into their introduction in Chapter 1. There we heard arguments for the importance of narrative-based analysis in international relations; we defined the concept of strategic narrative while contrasting narrative from discourse and frame; we partitioned the processes of strategic narrative into formation, projection, and reception; and we were introduced to a hierarchy of narrative analysis in the form the the spectrum of persuasion.

We will continue our close reading of Miskimmon et al for the next few posts. In the current post, we will focus on the contents of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3: actors and systems, respectively. In the Part 4, we will explore contestation and the information infrastructure.

The role of identity in narrative formation and reception

Central to the understanding of representational force proposed by Bially-Mattern² and advocated by Miskimmon et al, the identity of various actors tightly constrains the moves that are available to them. “Identities identify important aspects of an actor.” (p32) For advocates of this perspective, power is reducible to a complex of identities and contestation.

Thus Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero suggest that “power influences people’s threat perception only after identity between the self and the other has been established.” Others go further, arguing that power is not separate from questions of identity, as representational force is power itself: representational force traps others “with the credible threat emanating from potential violence to their “sense of self.” (p31)

Constructivism places this process of identity-formation at the heart of its theory. The maintenance of this web of meaning falls to narrative, and subsequently to the characterization of actors, notably: the contours of their agency.

While March and Olsen focus on a “logic of appropriateness” that “sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior, organized into institutions,” we suggest that strategic narratives are more helpful in understanding the construction of identity and behavior in international relations due to the narrative structure that includes actors and the agency that narratives afford actors. Narratives set out who the actors are, what characterizes them, what attributes they possess, what actions they take, and what motivates them. Actors are set within an environment or context that affects them even as they often affect the environment. We also claim that political actors can use narratives strategically to shape the behavior of others. (p32)

At the level of nation-states, identity formation is both constructive and public; the process draws on shared references—symbols, myths, histories, language and culture—to create a sense of solidarity and self-identity. “Bially-Mattern argues that “narrative is prior to and necessary for all other forms of communicative exchange.”” (p33) Indeed, some researchers suggest that the deployment of narrative can define a community not only by casting a frame within which the community can view itself but also by setting the very bounds of the community itself.

Collective identity “is a set of ideas that are generally accepted by any group of actors as defining what their collectivity is and the general rules under which it operates.” Leavy, in highlighting the role of media in the construction of collective identity, argues that “[n]arrative is the technique whereby collective memory is created, shaped, and reinforced, how meaning is imparted.” Eder goes farther, suggesting that “collective identities are narrative constructions which permit the control of the boundaries of a network of actors.” (p34)

Agency vs Structure Redux

One consequence of the widespread use of narrative deployment in theory is a softening of the contrast in the agency-structure debate. Narratives offer explicitly structural resources to emphasize both the agency of important actors and the anticipation inherent to cultural tropes loaded with telos and causality. After the narrative turn, the agency-structure distinction becomes less important: both perspectives are accommodated and fully resourced. Indeed, narrativity reduces them to two sides of the same coin. “We agree with Bially-Mattern and Sikkink in rejecting both extremes: “the two [agency and structure] are mutually constitutive;” structures and agency are mutually determined.”” (p34)

A Multi-Dimensional Taxonomy of Narrative Analysis

The analysis and case studies in these two chapters and in subsequent chapters of Miskimmon, et al make it difficult to maintain a rigorous distinction between narrative deployment and narrative employment, as I’ve advocated in a previous post. On the one hand, the analysis focuses on the formation and content of numerous strategic narratives from various actors, evincing a decidedly “deployment” perspective. On the other hand, the analytic abstraction undertaken by the authors and their audience is suggestive of a more “employment” (i.e. taxonomic / ontological) usage. The truth is that the distinction always amounts to a matter of perspective.

Complicating matters further, the variety of levels at which the concept of narrative are employed in the overarching theory of international relations undergirding the analysis in Miskimmon is suggestive of a much more complex taxonomy of usages. In addition to the distinction we are attempting to capture in the deployment vs. employment contrast, we can see a number of different distinctions that operate independently and suggest alternative dimensions of contrast. Most prominent in Miskimmon, but likely not exhaustive are:

1. World vs Theory: Since the concepts of narrative are at work in two different domains, these domains need to be kept distinct. Like our existing contrast, this is analogous to the object language vs meta-language distinction that we discussed earlier. However, where the deployment vs employment distinction is a matter of usage, the world vs theory distinction is a matter of domain. In the former, we ask whether we are interested in the form of the narrative or in its ontological status; in the latter we ask whether the question pertains to issues of “real world” events—in this case those of international affairs—or to issues of importance mainly in the formulation or evaluation of theory in some analytic domain or other.

2. “Looking in” vs “Looking Out”: Here we are interested in the perspective from which we view the narrative concepts themselves. On the former (“looking in”) we are concerned with how narratives interact with other things (including other narratives) in the world (or in the theory); on the latter (“looking out”) we are concerned with how all the pieces of a narrative—or a constellation of narratives—hang together. It should be clear from the centering of structural aspects of narrative in definition that distinctions on this dimension are rich with dynamic and temporal aspects. Here we capture the systemic aspect of narratives in their form and function, both internal and external. While a strong ontological reading is implied here, and indeed this dimension should be most often understood in the context of narrative employment, this is not a requirement; and much of the Miskimmon analysis with an deployment flavor makes heavy use of the internal and external dynamics at play in their formulation, projection, contestation, reception, and so on.

3. Content vs Context: In our analysis so far, we emphasized the content of narratives in efforts to characterize their structure and form, both in general, and as it pertains to individual examples. In Miskimmon et al, the analysis is broadened to include a number of non-linguistic features that would more accurately be referred to as context. Among their examples of context are the attitudes of actors, their status in the global order and the events that comprise the environment, both contemporary and historical. Content, by contrast, is made up of the linguistic (and otherwise semantic) material that structures the narrative itself.

4. Specific vs Generic: Likewise, we can contrast a specific narrative—for example, a strategic narrative about why to intervene in a particular crisis—from a generic narrative (or trope)—such as “a David versus Goliath situation”—which can be applied to a variety of specific situations with a number of shared properties. Specific narratives are often only lightly ontologized and frequently do not have names; since the typical mode of usage for specific strategic narratives in an IR setting is their deployment in statecraft, they do not often need to be referred to.

5. System (Thick) vs Issue (Thin): Finally, we can distinguish between system narratives and issue narratives, more or less as in Miskimmon et al. But by viewing this distinction as a dimensional attribute, we can see how it aligns with the hierarchy presented in the spectrum of persuasion. Issue narratives tend to focus on thin persuasion whereas system narratives are more of a matter of thick persuasion. But, to be clear, this alignment is not strictly required. Moreover, arguably the most effective form of thick persuasion is the consistent use of issue narratives that reinforce aspects of the preferred system narrative(s) merely as a projective side-effect of their deployment.

Surely more dimensions will fall out of careful scrutiny as our close reading of the literature continues. And we will want to revisit the taxonomy in the context of these new dimensions. Not least among the myriad new questions raised is whether an explicit taxonomy in the sense proposed is even warranted, independent of these dimensions of classification. It would be just as easy to organize the usages with a multi-dimensional coordinate system based on their most important features.

Actors in Strategic Narratives of IR

The narrative turn—and the parallel rise of soft power in the analysis of international politics—has generated renewed interest in the role of the information environment in shaping the range of possible outcomes for a given scenario. With the spectrum of persuasion, which we will revisit is a later post, we can see how activities in this space range from realist attempts to drive outcomes to post-structuralist attempts to define new narratives and archetypes, or to contest old ones.

Most fundamental to this normative and epistemological space—the “anarchic” space of state-state relations that is the domain of international relations (IR)—are the shared assumptions about what kinds of actors are to be found there. Miskimmon et al focus on a set of six types of actors (pp35-43). Each of these types of actors faces their own unique set of narrative challenges and strengths. “Narratives about actors highlight the expectations and behavior of those actors.” (p54) Simplifying substantially, we can summarize the narrative stakes at each level tersely as follows.

1. Unipole / Hegemon: legitimacy and hypocrisy

2. Great Powers: status and norms

3. Normal Powers: agency and self-interest

4. Rising Powers: power and independence

5. Weak States / Rogue States: governance and redemption

6. New Actors (Terrorists, NGOs, hackers and mercenaries):³ access and asymmetry

At both ends of the spectrum, narrative formation and contestation play a central role in the success of failure of actors in international affairs. At the top end, narratives “set the stage for understanding specific US foreign policies and actions because the narrative may structure the range of the possible.” (p53) While at the other end, terrorists and other non-state actors seek to augment their support, or even to upend the system altogether. “Al-Qaeda’s narrative sought to convince Muslim audiences to understand ongoing conflicts as part of a wider historical global attack on Islam by a belligerent a Zionist-Crusader alliance. [ … ] This narrative offered great certainty for those confused or disappointed by world events.” (p42) As the media ecology becomes more complex and more inclusive of marginal voices, the potential for actors of this sort to succeed in a radical transformation of the global system only grows.

As George notes, “As one moves from the highest level of policy making to the mass public, one expects to find a considerable simplification of the set of assertions and beliefs that lend support to the legitimacy of foreign policy. But the new media ecology complicates this simplification of narratives by adding actors, increasing interactivity, complicating audiences, and warping time and space. (p43)

United States as Great Power

Chapter 2 ends with an extended example that centers on the narrative formation used by the United States: first to establish its Great Power status at the beginning of the Cold War, then to maintain and deploy it in the early years after the end of the Cold War.

The Cold War: Establishing Great Power Status

Via the Truman Doctrine and related speechmaking, the United States was able to simultaneously project an international system—chiefly understood as a conflict between two primary actors—and to define its role within that system. The United States would be a champion of freedom; a heroic role demanded by the gravity of the times and the structure of the international system.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation. Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. (45, quoting the Truman Doctrine)

But such a forward-leaning stance has consequences. For the United States, some of the most important consequences were domestic. A champion of the freedom and equality must indeed live up to those values at home.

The problem with having to shape the narrative within a context that took into account this domestic political situation, was that this stark narrative—without nuance—contributed to the shape of future policies and narratives. (p45)

Post Cold War: Maintaining the Status

Miskimmon et al focus their attention after the Cold War on narrative formation in the wake of 9/11. Given the extent to which the United States abrogated its narrative responsibilities after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union—”We win. You lose.”—this emphasis is warranted. But it would be better to say that the real problem with US narratives about the end of the Cold War was that we never really offered any.

One detail emphasized repeatedly by Miskimmon et al in (near-)contemporary examples is the extent to which a changing media ecology impacts the narrative capabilities of states and their communicators. At first, this meant a wider diversity of state actors and their agents, as new outlets such as Al Jazeera became globally available. But the challenges only grew over time, as the entrance of independent and social medias further expanded the range of publicly advocated attitudes and opinions. The US strategic narrative evolved to accommodate this reality. “Still, in narratives across the Bush and Obama presidencies, US leadership in the international system is emphasized, and a new media ecology challenges the ability of the US to project its strategic narrative.” (p47)

Reminiscent of the Cold War narrative juxtaposing the freedom-loving West and the totalitarian East, US strategic narratives in the early 21st century emphasized the need to unite against a common enemy hostile to international order and shared values. “On the one hand these states are tied together in the international system against a common enemy”. (p48)

Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war. Today, the world’s great powers find ourselves on the same side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. (p48, quoting NSS 2002⁴)

On the other hand, the unipole status of the United States requires it to balance an acknowledgement of its unique status against an emphasis on the importance of partner states with aligned values.

In National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS 2006) a shift occurs as democracies are cited much more often as actors central to the strategic narrative. This ties in to more emphasis the narrative on democratic states as champions or heroes. (p48)

The engagement of other powers—normal powers and rising powers, for example—in defense of the international system is constitutive of the international system. To the extent that it exists at all, the roles defined for actors in the international system undergird its very capacity to act as a system.

These enemies, however, are enemies shared by great powers, according to the national security strategies, and this opens up opportunities for collaboration and cooperation. As will be discussed below, the strategic narrative suggests that the rise of these enemies challenges fundamental concepts associated with the international system, including deterrence. (p49)

The emergence of new types of actors threatens to upend the cart. The consequences could be as dire as “a mushroom cloud.” The new narrative encourages developed states to help others avoid falling into the traps endemic to weak states; undertaking the malicious acts of rogue states; and/or failing to combat terrorists. “Fragile states in Africa must be supported, according to the narrative in 2002. [ … ] By 2006, the focus of the narratives shifts significantly. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran take center stage.” (p49)

Of course, one of the main features of strategic narratives is that they are designed to serve the interests of their authors. The US strategic narratives used in defense of the Global War on Terror are certainly no exception, setting the United States as number one among equals. The implications for US unilateralism are profound.

Overall, the narrative describes the international system as one of states as primary actors with the US as a leader. The antagonists are nonstate actors—terrorists and rogue states—that threaten not only the United States and others in the system, but the very system itself. This sets the stage for the narrative to suggest that the United States will be ready to act unilaterally to pursue its own self-defined interests. (p50)

Systems: Narratives of the International Order

Beyond actors, narratives offer an extensive framework for the analysis and curation of international systems, specifically: order. “Order’s central place in the study of international relations ensures that a multitude of actors contribute to the shaping of our conceptions of order, its purpose and utility.” (p60) With strategic narratives, we have a complete account of the processes undergirding order: development, production and maintenance.

Strategic narrative offers explanation for three aspects of international affairs. First, strategic narratives contribute to how order is conceived. We outline that the use of strategic narrative is a central component of the development of conceptions of order. Narratives compete to define what order is and terms on which we understand order. Second, strategic narratives play an important role in the production of order. The communication of narratives shapes deliberations on policy choices faced by political actors. Finally, strategic narratives are central to the maintenance of order. They define the nature of existing order(s) in the international system. (p61)

Narratives are a natural framework for the treatment of complex events involving numerous actors. But they can be reductive and simple-minded; a non-trivial complication given their power in shaping both events and their perception. “Often this narrative work is presented in binaries— good and evil; democratic and authoritarian. These often-simplistic narratives shape our expectations of the emerging order that have decisive influence of government policies.” (p60) And the emergence of new media in the media ecology has complicated the dynamic, offering access to a wide range of new actors—both state and non-state. “One impact of the new media ecology on foreign policy is to radically change who is able to project narratives of international order and to allow more open challenge to narratives of great powers in the system.” (p62) In such a dynamic media ecology, a large number of narratives face active contestation as they compete for dominance. The selective pressures of the new media ecology favor narratives that connect with their audiences, namely narratives that are authentic, familiar, plausible and coherent. Moreover, the coverage of a narrative plays a critical role in its appeal: the more a narrative can “explain” disparate “facts” the more it gains prominence in the media and in the minds of publics and elites.

“Containing Soviet Union ambitions became the central narrative of US foreign policy after World War II.” (p67) But this simplistic binary narrative of the Cold War suggests no modern analogue of international order. Indeed, the “purpose” of international cooperation and norms is left under-defined and hotly contested.

Despite the diffusion of institutional cooperation between states, the post—Cold War era has not witnessed a shared narrative on the emerging international order. [ … ] Binary narratives of capitalism versus communism, East versus West, and good vs evil, no longer generate the cohesive centripetal forces to bind states together as they once did. (p62)

Be that as it may, the churn continues. Narratives ebb and flow in an ongoing swirl of formation, projection, reception and contestation. “This process, we argue, is not passive. Political agents seek to encourage emulation through the creation of shared meanings by projecting narratives to policy elites and through the new media ecology.” (p63) The nature of the international order remains dynamic and contested. In the absence of deep, existential and binary oppositions between potential hegemonic powers, this ambiguity is likely to persist.

Balance and the Nature of the International Order

Of course, the use of narrative in the study of social sciences is not new. History, in particular, has a long and partially-conflicted experience with the use of narrative deployment in the formulation of its work-product. But replication in the public media ecology gives these narratives a predictive power that borders on self-fulfilling: wide and deep reception of a narrative can effectively constrain the choice space. “The application of narrative approaches to the study of order can be seen in history, legal studies, political science, public policy, and sociology. Narratives have real impact on international affairs by guiding states toward certain goals and strategies.” (p63) Indeed, narratives allow conventions to become actualized in the practices of living people and institutions. We can see this process at work in legal, political and cultural systems.

Narratives are then also a means to bridge uncertainty and require actors and networks to spread.” […] Karin Fierke cites legal scholar Robert Cover’s contention that, “No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exist apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning . . . Once understood in the context of narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.” (p68)

The metaphor of balance is especially important to contemporary conceptions of order. Indeed, balance is a prominent telos in many narratives of order.

Narrative conceptions of order manifest themselves un the foreign policy choices governments make. Order is often conceived through the metaphor of balance. Balance is achieved when the structure of international relations is characterized by the balance of power among the powerful units in the system. Balance of power is central to many approaches to international order—achieving balance is seen as a necessary goal of international affairs. (pp63-4)

The Narrative Implications of Hard Power

Realists, though, suggest that reception and contestation are also functions of material concerns more reflective of traditional hard power. More powerful actors can shape the perception of order through their actions and their capacity to persuade (i.e. compel) others. Success in traditional games of power (war and diplomacy) offers substantial influence in shaping international order.

Realist conceptions of order, then, focus on power and the extent to which hegemonic actors can use military force to secure the existing hierarchy and deter challengers. Lake argues that social power is insufficient to establish and maintain order. Rather, it is the ability to offer material incentives that reinforces hierarchy and authority in the system. (p64)

Aside from the raw assertion of power itself, this influence has substantial narrativity. Widely received narratives about how order will work in the future will be based in no small part on how order has worked in the past and how it works in the present. But as the nature of the international order falls more deeply into contestation—and, indeed, as the very significance of nation-states becomes open to question⁵—we find less clarity on important issues of legitimacy and sovereignty in prevailing narratives of order. “Hierarchy is in transition; it is therefore not clear how intervention can be legitimated, and it is also not clear how and when international authority should override domestic democratic authority.” (p65)

Giving Purpose to the International Order

The advantage of Cold War narratives was that they played well with both domestic and foreign audiences. In a contrast with the Soviet Union, the United States was an unambiguous winner. This gave Western communicators ample materiel for the construction of strategic narratives at all levels: system, identity and issue.

Roosevelt and Truman drew on ideas that resonated with US political culture. Those ideas also resonated with European liberal democracies. And it had a clear Other in the USSR to help define this, hence a binary narrative opposite. This identity enabled the construction of the West in a way that made sense to those in that community. (p66)

While the United States retained its hegemon status after the Cold War and the benefits of its values and leadership remain much as they had been, the narrative basis of US leadership—and the international system that it leads—has not been updated compellingly to keep pace with the subsequent changes. Without the foil offered by the USSR, US strategic narratives must necessarily become more inclusive. “Both Ikenberry and Slaughter agree the US and the institutions it leads are a hub through which others can help themselves and others. But he does not ask how this enables a shared narrative to emerge. If the US is integrative, it needs to weave in others’ narratives.” (p67) Of course, inclusivity is hardly enough, as foreign actors, even allies, offer competing narratives more beneficial to their own interests or more aligned with facts as understood by publics and elites.

Rather than providing a hegemonic narrative of transition, the 1990s witnessed contestation over the legacy of the Cold War and lacked a blueprint for transition. […] It is within this context of uncertainty that China, the EU, the US, and other leading actors have sought to project their narratives. Rather than witness the diffusion of the US narrative, the end of bipolarity and its apparent binary choices has been replaced with multiple complexities and uncertainty. (p68)

In this environment, contestation is the rule, not the exception. Many authors argue that this is just the natural course of history for a late-stage superpower.

Drawing on the work of Modelski, they argue, “delegitimation occurs after the hegemon (or unipole) has begun its relative decline. In Modelski’s scheme, delegitimation is followed by a ‘deconcentration/coalition building’ phase, in which power becomes even more diffuse and balance of power alliances start to form. (p69)

Nevertheless, the United Stated remains the sole global superpower, not least because a more attractive alternative has not emerged.

While the consensus opinion is that U.S. power is eroding, the legitimacy of the United States’ international order and authority to rule have not, to this point, been seriously undermined. Any challenger that seeks to restore global balance-of-power dynamics, therefore, must put forward an alternative idea of order that appeals to other powerful states. Delegitimizing U.S. unipolarity and proposing a viable new order are prerequisite exercises for traditional balancing behavior to commence. (p69. quoting Schweller and Pu).

Still, states have lost control of the narrative domain. The new media ecology has greatly expanded the number of players in the game. “States no longer have the option to conduct relations with the world in grand diplomatic set pieces, controlling who is in and who is not in the room.” (p69) Crafting a compelling strategic narrative robust to contestation in this sphere requires a complex balancing of events as they are—rather, as they are perceived to be—and the attitudes already dominant in your audiences. It is quite often the case that the details of events offer more give than the attitudes of publics. Put bluntly, “[t]he ability to devise and implement a coherent strategic narrative rests on the vagaries of events and the views of others.” (p69)

The Credibility of a Chinese Threat

The collapse of the Cold War narrative has done violence to our notion of “us” in the absence of a concrete and juxtaposed “them.” Indeed, “[t]he difficulty in contemporary international affairs is that the we-ness is more complex to maintain. Instead of the Cold War binary, there is a more diverse system emerging with new more diverse voices.” (p70)

Analysts argue that the current international conditions are not supportive of a new superpower, instead offering a Great Powers view of regional hegemony. “Changes in social support on either the domestic or international level could thus quite quickly shift the US from superpower to great power status.” Although a (relatively) descendant United States views an ascendant China as an urgent threat, it is not clear that this attitude is widely shared, even amongst our closest allies. Challenges to U.S. hegemony are not as compelling in a world in which stability is managed by “a coalition of the willing” rather than an existential standoff between two diametrically opposed systems of living.

To the extent that realist thinking dominates in Washington, and the US retains its commitment to not tolerating any peer competitors, then a rising China, whether peaceful or not, must appear threatening to the US. The nature of the China that rises, however, will be crucial to whether others share US perceptions of China as a threat. In the absence of any common cause, it is far from clear that other powers will feel threatened by China’s challenge to US hegemony. (p71, quoting Buzan)

Furthermore, China is an active player in the narrative domain and will remain so for the foreseeable future. CCP are certain to offer competing narratives and to contest important U.S. strategic narratives both directly and through its proxies. If, for example, a “peaceful rise” narrative becomes received wisdom, persuading others to view China as a threat may be beyond the capacity of U.S. narrative builders.

The Flattening of the Narrative Battlespace: Individual Actors in the New Media Ecology

“Public dialogue within overlapping national and international public spheres does more than simply provide information about preferences; it allows interested actors and expert observers to contest truth claims and interest claims.” (p71) And, again, the emergence of the new media ecology has contributed to the obsolescence of the nation-state and establishment media in matters of narrative formation, projection, reception and contestation.

There has been a decisive move from a two-step model of communication—involving political actors projecting narratives and frames to news media, which then filter that content by interaction with niche groups—to a one-step model where communication technologies allow for direct targeting by political actors. (pp71-2)

Strategic Narrative in Action: 2011 NATO Intervention in Libya

Despite all the churn outlined in the previous section, “[t]here is, however, no obvious alternative to the US liberal narrative of international order.” (p72) As a concrete example, Miskimmon et al conclude their discussion of “strategic narratives of international order” with a case study on the narratives deployed by major state actors in the 2011 debates regarding intervention in Libya. In a reversal of conventional attitudes, leaders in Europe favored interventions, where the United States was skeptical and reticent. In the end, the pro-intervention perspective won the day and NATO launched a limited air campaign in Libya—taking the form of a “no fly zone”—nominally in support of anti-government forces.

Despite the reticence of the United States—or perhaps because of it—this example offers a particularly useful lens into the workings of strategic narrative in world affairs. “We can chart the use of strategic narrative through the narratives that states draw on in arguing for the use of military force in international crises.” (p72) Even more specifically, the 2011 debate “concerning the decision to enforce a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011 represents an interesting test case for demonstrating the complexity major powers face to project a strategic narrative.” (p73) In this light, the authors take a closer look at the specific strategic narratives deployed by a handful of actors: France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States, China and Russia, all members of the United Nations Security Council.

France

In France, Sarkozy framed events as an effort to stave off catastrophe, and cast France (and himself) in a heroic role.

He narrativized events by framing a problem, characterizing himself and France (we take responsibility), and projecting an imagined terrible ending (“Let’s be sure not to arrive too late!”). Thus Sarkozy was the vehicle for, face of, and narrator of, France’s strategic narrative. (p74)

What is most remarkable about Sarkozy’s narrative is now unremarkable it is. Indeed, “France’s narrative defines a perception of order that approximates liberal interventionism.” (p74)

Germany

Perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, Germany took a stance opposed to intervention but ultimately abstained in its vote. In the German narrative, the projected ending was a catastrophe stemming from the intervention itself. “Like Sarkozy, Wittig offers a projection of the future, but his terrible ending is a different one—a “protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region.”” (p75) Even worse, on the German telling, too much intervention now might create a burdensome expectation that Europeans will play an ongoing interventionist security role.

Second, Westerwelle asserted that he did not consider military intervention to be correct strategy for dealing with Libya and that a military response could have the potential to create growing expectations for a greater crisis management role for Europeans in the future. He was offering a further projected negative or unwanted ending to the narrative. (p76)

To buttress the narrative, the German arguments about the intervention framed the problems faced by Libya as domestic problems, rather than problems of international security. “Germany’s narrative was desecuritizing the crisis, making the problem and solution the stuff of domestic politics rather than international crisis management.” (p77) Ultimately, the inconsistency of the German narrative as compared to those it had embraced in previous interventions put Germany’s credibility into question.

Germany’s decision to take part in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was deemed to be a signal of greater German responsibility for international crisis management to protect human rights. Germany’s abstention over Libya was criticized for not continuing this narrative. (p75)

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, however, opted for an aggressively pro-intervention stance. At the same time, their narrative options were somewhat limited by the stances already adopted by major allies, especially Germany. Specifically, “[t]he UK was careful not to be openly critical of Germany’s abstention on UNSCR1973.” (p78) And a strong appetite to avoid appearance of self-interest acted as a strong motivator as well. “UK officials were very keen to stress the broad acceptance of their narrative and avoid focusing on UK interests.” (p79) Ultimately—in this observer’s opinion—they more thoroughly embraced the second of these two narratives with a measured demonstration of Godwin’s Law.

This narrative connection with Pol Pot and Hitler drew historical analogies—or as D’Andrade and Strass argue, cognitive schemas—from two reviled figures and provided a powerful context for generating support for military action against Gadhafi’s forces. It gave texture to the narrative by using these historical frames or templates to characterize the enemy actor in a way that warranted action to stop him. (p79)

The United States

Meanwhile, Barack Obama was thoroughly committed to his doctrine of “no stupid wars” and, in any event, was reluctant to engage in military operations in the lead-up to the 2012 elections. Not surprisingly, the contestation faced by Obama when he did come around to intervention was domestic, and centered on matters of “inside baseball.”

Even though, as events demonstrated, the US still needed to undertake the majority of the heavy lifting for the military operations in Libya, the involvement of France and the UK, along with the Arab League and eventually NATO, allowed Obama to present a strategic narrative of multilateral engagement shared responsibility. Obama’s decision to support UN1973 was criticized on procedural grounds, however, for not including Congress in discussion leading up to the vote. Thus, the process of forming the US strategic narrative was contested. (p80)

Of course, we all remember that large segments of America considered anything done by Obama to be illegitimate, almost a priori. But on an international stage, the U.S. position emphasized exactly the right notes for the UK and French narratives to win the day. “The powerful narrative of the international communities’ responsibility to protect, the role of the Arab League, and the centrality of universal human rights as motivations for action all mirrored the Franco-British narrative.” (p80)

The same US narrative played a domestic role as well. And, to the extent that it could quiet Tea Party and other reactionary voices under the din of American conventional wisdom, it did so. “The US responsibility to maintain international order was central to Obama’s strategic narrative, both to claim international leadership and to convince the US public of his rationale for involvement in the no-fly zone.” (p81)

China and Russia

China and Russia were never expected to support intervention, and their abstention at the Security Council—as opposed to a no vote—is perhaps a testament to the power of European narratives in support of interventions. China and Russia each had reasons, albeit slightly different ones, to oppose establishing or reinforcing norms supportive of intervention in the international system.

China and Russia have been skeptical of military intervention to uphold international order. [ … ] China and Russia’s narrative on military intervention have stressed the importance of international law and national sovereignty. China’s foreign policy narrative of peaceful rise has ensured that the Chinese government has been reluctant to involve China in military crisis management operations (p82)

As veto-wielding members of the Security Council, it was within their power to block a pro-interventionist resolution. They did not. But their anti-interventionist perspectives forced them onto a curious “middle ground” that implicitly validated pro-interventionist frames by not blocking their incorporation into real world events.

China and Russia’s narratives were more about fundamentals of their foreign policy narratives than the individual case before them. A disconnect between national narratives of international order and the West’s interventionist narrative ensured that whilst there are clear efforts to express concern for the situation, they could not openly support the resolution. (p83)

Comparing Strategic Narratives

Probably the biggest contribution in the second half of Chapter 3 is the presentation of these various narratives as “results” in tabular form. In their summary, each of the following features are elaborated for each of the actors. By way of example, I will summarize the US position, as presented in the authors’ table (pp85-7).

1. Policy goals: Diplomacy and sanction; removal of Gadhafi; eventual support of NFZ.

2. Role of domestic politics: Little discussions of Libya; only non-binding resolution in the Senate on 1/2/2011 Obama central to final decision.

3. Constraints on historical narrative: Pressures on living up to great power narrative and leadership; Obama’s concern to distinguish his foreign policy from G. W. Bush.

4. Events: Concern to respond to Arab Spring and set agenda in the region whilst encouraging partners in the maintenance of order.

5. Conception of order: Order can be maintained through the use of military force akin to Liberal Interventionism outlined in Tony Blair’s Chicago Speech of 1998. The United States bears responsibility to maintain the post-World War II order.

6. New media technologies: Extensive use of public diplomacy to attempt nonmilitary solution (Stratton, 2011).

7. Timing of communication: Obama’s decision to support UN1973 only in the final hours; supportive of Franco-UK lead and of Arab League.

8. Dissemination networks: UNSC, NATO and the London conference, March 29, 2011 as well as Obama’s speech outlining his reasons for supporting UN1973 on March 28, 2011.

9. Credibility of messages for audiences: Position as most powerful nation; claim to leadership.

10. Effects of competing narratives: Obama has significant room to maneuver a Commander in Chief, allowing him to hold back on final agreement.

11. Types of reception (support, acquiescence, protest, appropriation): Largely supportive domestic audience.

12. Contingent factors affecting reception: Mission was considered to be very successful.

While there is undoubtedly a lot of hand waving in the population of these—largely qualitative—cells, just the labels used for the various rows are suggesting of deeper assumptions and starting points for additional study. On the other hand, while this clarity is greatly appreciated in the context of their case study, it is hard to imagine how it could be generalized in a repeatable and consistent manner. Too much of this methodology is seasoned to taste. At most, such an inventory is suggestive of starting points for future research, with narrower goals and more precise metrics. The precise relationship between these specific strategic narratives and generic narratives such as responsibility to protect remains largely under-explored.

Process-focussed Narrative Analysis

The authors do offer some cleavage points and generalizations that portend opportunities for more concrete research. Isolating the processes at work is among the most promising of these proposals.

We argue that a strategic narrative involves three interconnected and complementary dynamics, understood as the processes of narrative formation, narrative projection and narrative reception. (p83)

Dissecting the Libya case study with each of these processes in mind yields somewhat more lucid and digestible—perhaps also more actionable—generalizations. For example:

1. In terms of formation, domestic political culture and national strategic cultures defined the formation of national narratives of the crisis. (p84)

2. In terms of the spectrum of persuasion, the strategic narrative of the UK and France in favor of intervention had limited impact on China, Germany and Russia. (p88)

3. The US initial leadership-avoidance narrative quickly waned when NATO became the main forum for enforcing the no-fly zone. Ultimately, despite Obama’s hesitancy to become embroiled in an overseas military operation, the US could not argue against the way in which France and the UK narrativized the R2P discourse, as it was consistent with US narrative and values. (p88)

These more limited and precise assessments defy a systemic treatment—at least more than a superficial one—but offer compelling hooks on which to hang future research.

Getting Concrete: Ontologized Narratives in IR Analysis

As I mentioned above, we can distinguish between specific strategic narratives like the ones deployed by state actors and described in the Libya example and more generic ontological narratives like responsibility to protect and universal human rights. Most notably, a prominent feature of the latter is their utility in formulating the former. This is a feature we will revisit with some frequency in future posts.

Conclusions

Ultimately, in part by charting a navigable course between rationalism and constructivism, an emphasis on narrative offers the best frame for understanding soft power. It entails a capacity for narrative formation, projection and reception that not only serves state interests in international discourse, but also provides the bounds and norms of the international order itself.

There is a real world independent of us, but narratives shape how we perceive and understand it and those understandings condition behavior. [ … ] The new media ecology does not alter material power allocation among powerful states and nonstate actors. But it does both facilitate and complicate the ways in which powerful states are able to shape conceptions of order. Therefore order is the narrated understandings of the material base and the normative frameworks intrinsic to those understandings. In making this argument we draw on both rationalist literature concerning order and constructivist understandings of international relations. (p89)

In Part 4, we will look more closely at contestation and the new media ecology as they are discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of Miskimmon et al. Hopefully that will ship in two weeks as usual. Apologies for the delay in getting Part 3 together. The day job intervened.

1. O'Loughlin, Ben & Miskimmon, Alister & Roselle, Laura. (2013). Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order. 10.4324/9781315871264.

2. Mattern, Janice Bially. Ordering international politics: Identity, crisis, and representational force. Psychology Press, 2005.

3. “NGOs, hackers and mercenaries” is my own addition. But I think they extend the class in a way that better exposes the precariousness of the post-Westphalian rein of nation-states. And in a turn-of-the-Century publication by the PLA (Unrestricted Warfare, 1999) Chinese Military officers include NGOs and investors such as George Soros in their list of non-military actors in modern warfare. The use of economic power as an instrument of war—in the sense of achieving political ends via extra-political means—plays an important role in that document, but is not much emphasized here.

4. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002.

5. “Ikenberry suggests that the US-led liberal international order is unstable because its basic—the Westphalian system—is eroding. Global interdependence created processes with which the international system cannot cope. According to Ikenberry we need a new governance architecture: the US must remake the global milieu.” (p65)